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Abstract—We present Tracking Protection in the Mozilla Fire-
fox web browser. Tracking Protection is a new privacy technology
to mitigate invasive tracking of users’ online activity by blocking
requests to tracking domains. We evaluate our approach and
demonstrate a 67.5% reduction in the number of HTTP cookies
set during a crawl of the Alexa top 200 news sites. Since Firefox
does not download and render content from tracking domains,
Tracking Protection also enjoys performance benefits of a 44%
median reduction in page load time and 39% reduction in data
usage in the Alexa top 200 news sites.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has a symbiotic relationship with the
Internet ecosystem. Advertisers pay content publishers, i.e.,
websites, to embed promotional material in the content they
generate. Publishers in turn use that revenue to mitigate the
need for users to directly purchase the content they consume.
In 2013, revenue from US online advertising reached $43
billion, supporting the vast majority of publishers [1]. A prime
reason for its accelerated growth is the rise of efficient markets
for targeted promotions.
Unfortunately, the technology to personalize advertise-
ments and other site content relies extensively on tracking
online activities of users. On top of that, governments misuse
these technologies to facilitate warrantless surveillance without
the knowledge or consent of the users or the original tracking
services themselves.
The rise of online advertising has led to a corresponding
increase in ad-blocking and privacy-oriented software. In 2013
ad-blocking grew nearly 70%, with nearly 41% of 18-29 year
olds reporting usage [2]. Even though typical users may not
be aware of the broad reach of tracking technologies, they feel
that the advertising industry is insufficiently regulated and lack
confidence protecting their data online [3], [4].
In response to this clarion call from users, we designed
and implemented Tracking Protection in Mozilla Firefox 35.
We demonstrate a 67.5% reduction in the number of HTTP
cookies set during a crawl of the Alexa top 200 news sites.
The reduction in cookies corresponds to blocking 11 tracking
elements on 50% of these sites. Since Firefox does not
download and render content from tracking domains, Tracking
Protection also enjoys performance benefits of a 44% median
reduction in page load time and 39% reduction in data usage
in the Alexa top 200 news sites.
II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Tracking is a mechanism to identify a person and their
browsing behavior. Tracking Protection for Firefox addresses
a particular type of tracking that occurs when content from
a tracking domain appears across multiple websites. Initially,
tracking domains identified users through third-party cookies.
Early attempts to mitigate tracking focused on blocking cook-
ies, but other technologies utilizing local storage, fingerprint-
ing, and etags evolved to be as powerful as cookies [5]–[7].
To cover the wide array of tracking technologies in
use, Tracking Protection for Firefox prevents any network
communication between the browser and unsafe third-party
origins. It filters outgoing HTTP requests and cancels ones
to known tracking domains. One challenge of this approach
is that blocking content can break a site’s functionality or
appearance. For example, elements on the page may depend
on a script being loaded from a tracking domain. To minimize
unanticipated side-effects of Tracking Protection, we rely on
a curated blocklist. Previous approaches have used heuristics
or a default-deny policy at the expense of usability [8].
We implement an API based on Google Safe Browsing,
a mechanism for efficient URL-based blocklist updates and
lookups [9]. We use a subset of approximately 1500 domains
from Disconnect’s privacy-oriented blocklist to identify these
unsafe origins [10]. We update the blocklist every 45 minutes
to minimize the effects of incorrect blocklist entries.
When the browser is ready to make a network request, Fire-
fox suspends it until Tracking Protection determines whether
the destination URL is a tracking domain. If so, Firefox cancels
the request before any data is sent or received. Canceling
HTTP requests leaves the respective content loaders for doc-
uments, images, and scripts in a failed state. The network
layer notifies individual loaders of cancellations and emits a
document-wide security event.
Firefox indicates when it blocks tracking elements by
showing a shield icon in the location bar (Figure 1). Clicking
the shield presents a doorhanger that allows the user to
disable Tracking Protection for the site in order mitigate the
effects of false positives or loss of functionality. Disabling
Tracking Protection updates the shield icon with a red strike-
through while the doorhanger allows the user to re-enable
protection (Figure 2).
To enable Tracking Protection in Firefox
35 and later, visit about:config and set
privacy.trackingprotection.enabled to true.
Fig. 1. When Tracking Protection blocks tracking elements, Firefox shows a
shield icon in the location bar. Clicking the shield presents a dropdown panel
that allows the user to disable Tracking Protection for that site.
Fig. 2. If the user disables Tracking Protection for a site, Firefox shows
a shield icon with a red strike-through to warn the user. Clicking the shield
presents a dropdown panel that allows the user to re-enable protection.
TABLE I. HTTP COOKIES SET BY THE ALEXA TOP 200 NEWS SITES.
ENABLING TRACKING PROTECTION RESULTS IN 67.5% FEWER COOKIES.
Configuration # Cookies Reduction
Default 4006 0.0%
Tracking Protection 1300 67.5%
Adblock Plus 2398 40.1%
III. EVALUATION
We conduct simulated tests on Tracking Protection as well
as measuring its effects in the field. We evaluate privacy
benefits by measuring the reduction in HTTP cookies set and
the number of blocked tracking elements per site, and the
performance benefits by measuring reduction in page load time
and data usage. We instrumented Firefox Nightly (the earliest
pre-release version of Firefox) using Mozmill1 to visit the
Alexa 200 most popular news sites as our data set. We focus
on news sites because they typify content providers who trade
free content in exchange for advertising revenue. Each site
was visited 10 times with and without Tracking Protection and
the median values of identified trackers, load time and bytes
downloaded were computed to represent it. Content caching
and prefetching were disabled.
A. Simulated testing
Tracking Protection blocks at least one unsafe element on
99% of the sites tested. In addition, Tracking Protection blocks
11 tracking elements in 50% of the sites and, in an extreme
case, 150 tracking elements. Since tracking elements usually
end up requesting more resources from tracking domains, these
figures present only a lower bound of the number of elements
that would load without Tracking Protection. Figure 3 shows
the distribution of tracking elements per site. Table II lists the
types of elements blocked by Tracking Protection.
To evaluate the effects of tracking on client-side state, we
studied the browser’s cookie store after crawling the Alexa
top 200 news sites on three different configurations of Fire-
fox Nightly: default (Tracking Protection disabled), Tracking
Protection enabled, and Adblock Plus installed in a default
lists. Table I shows Tracking Protection is more effective in
reducing tracking cookies than Adblock Plus, resulting in a
67.5% reduction in cookies when compared to a default profile.
Figures 4 and 5 present the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the reduction in median load time for the home page
1https://developer.mozila.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/Mozmill
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Fig. 3. CDF of the number of trackers on the Alexa top 200 news sites. 50%
of them have at least 11 trackers present.
TABLE II. DOM TYPES ASSOCIATED WITH TRACKING DOMAINS.
Tracking Element Count Percent
SCRIPT 1,890 79.2%
IMG 334 14.0%
IFRAME 149 6.3%
OBJECT 13 0.5%
of each site and reduction in data usage, respectively. Load
time is the interval between when the browser starts loading
a top-level URL and when the page emits the load event.
Data usage is the total number of bytes of all the resources
under the top-level page. For each site, we measure load time
and data usage with and without Tracking Protection enabled
and calculate the reduction. The median reduction in page load
time is 44%, and the median reduction in data usage is 39%.
Studies show that users prefer faster load times [11], and con-
serving data can benefit bandwidth-constrained environments
such as mobile. Note that the overhead eliminated by Tracking
Protection comes from reducing third-party rather than first-
party content on each page.
As an example, www.weather.com loads in 3.5 seconds
with Tracking Protection versus 6.3 seconds without and
results in data usage of 2.8 MB (98 HTTP requests) versus
4.3 MB (219 HTTP requests), respectively. Even though
Tracking Protection prevents initial requests for only 4 HTML
<script> elements, without Tracking Protection, an ad-
ditional 45 domains are contacted. Of the additional re-
sources downloaded without Tracking Protection enabled, 57%
are JavaScript (as identified by the content-type HTTP
TABLE III. TOP LEVEL PAGE LOADS FOR TRACKING PROTECTION.
Page Loads Count Percent
Tracking Protection active (Figure 1) 236,325 13.9%
Tracking Protection disabled (Figure 2) 2,684 0.17%
No tracking elements present 1,456,368 86%
Total 1,695,557 100%
header) and, 27% are images. The largest elements appear to be
JavaScript libraries with advertisement-related names, each on
the order of 10 or 100 KB. Even though client-side caching can
alleviate data usage, we observe high-entropy GET parameters
that will cause the browser to fetch them each time. Privacy-
conscious users clearing their cache often will also have to
download them again.
B. User testing
From 2014 December 25 to 2015 January 7 inclusive,
we used the Firefox Telemetry2 framework to measure top-
level page loads from Firefox Nightly users3 who enabled
Tracking Protection. Firefox Nightly enables Telemetry by
default. Because of limitations in data collection, we do not
know the exact number of users with Tracking Protection
enabled. However, approximately 140,000 users run Firefox
Nightly at least once a week, and during the test period approx-
imately 0.5% of browser sessions enabled Tracking Protection.
Table III presents a breakdown on page loads for sessions
with Tracking Protection enabled. By policy Telemetry does
not collect URL data, so multiple visits to the same website
count as separate page loads. 14.1% of page loads contain at
least one tracking element. Of these, users indicate breakage
by disabling Tracking Protection only 1.2% (0.17%/13.9%) of
the time. We can attribute the difference between the volume
of page loads and number of sites containing at least one
tracking element to the fact that popular sites account for a
disproportionate number of page views.
IV. RELATED WORK
Adblock Plus, Disconnect, and Ghostery are browser ex-
tensions utilizing curated, URL-based blocklists to prevent
network requests for privacy-invasive or otherwise undesirable
web content [10], [12], [13]. Adblock is the most popular add-
on for Firefox and Chrome [14], but it incurs a prohibitively-
high resource overhead [15]. What is more, users need to
manually install these extensions as opposed to having that
functionality built in the browser. Nevertheless, they are or-
thogonal to Tracking Protection in Firefox and can complement
the set of tracking domains being blocked.
Privacy Badger is a browser extension that uses heuristics
instead of a URL blocklist to identify and block traffic to
tracking domains. Although preliminary research has been
successful in algorithmically identifying tracking domains, op-
erational experience with Privacy Badger suggests that relying
on heuristics alone leads to an intolerable amount of site
breakage for a typical user [8], [16], [17].
Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE) has had a feature
similar to Firefox Tracking Protection, called Tracking Pro-
tection Lists (TPL), since 2011 [18]. Unlike Firefox Tracking
2https://wiki.mozilla.org/Telemetry
3Nightly is the earliest pre-release channel and attracts the most technically
proficient users.
Protection, Microsoft’s TPL format supports allowing domains
in addition to blocking them, with the allowlist taking prece-
dence. Combining multiple lists can therefore lead to reduced
coverage. MSIE also allows the user to select multiple lists,
none of which are officially supported by Microsoft, leading
to a confusing user experience [19].
V. FUTURE WORK
Content trackers include user-visible components that may
break functionality of the site if they are blocked. Examples of
content trackers include social widgets such as the Facebook
Like button, video hosting sites such as Vimeo, and comment-
ing platforms such as Disqus. Research [16], [20] in this area
prevents such content from loading until the user interacts with
it, in which case the tracker is activated, or attempts to recreate
the functionality in a privacy-preserving manner. For users
who value content trackers, we must make the privacy-utility
tradeoff clear and possibly offer the option to strip identifying
information (cookies, etags) from outgoing network requests.
Another open challenge is applying Tracking Protection
only to third-party content. We can avoiding cross-site track-
ing by blocking content from high-volume sites such as
facebook.com without breaking them when visited directly.
Heuristics such as the Public Suffix List4 can help better
determine the set of domains that are considered first-party.
However, modern practices such as use of content distribu-
tion networks (e.g., Facebook’s CDN is fbcdn.net) make
relationships between sites difficult to discover.
Tracking Protection affects page rendering if blank areas
appear in place of blocked tracking elements such as images
or iframes. Some add-ons, such as Adblock Plus, attempt to
resolve this problem by hiding these elements or removing
them from the Document Object Model tree (DOM). However,
these approaches may result in orphaned elements and other
unattractive side-effects, including large performance penalties
for re-drawing the DOM.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet’s principal revenue model leads to misaligned
incentives between users, advertisers, and content providers,
essentially creating a race to the bottom. Industry wields the
most political and economic power, so it is up to users and
user agents to advocate for the interests of people.
Do Not Track is a standards effort to communicate a user’s
preference regarding tracking to sites that they visit [21].
Despite having been in progress since 2009, DNT has not
gained traction in industry, due to lobbying efforts from the
ad industry. There are currently no legal or technological
requirements tied to DNT. We cannot rely on the industry
to self-regulate through standards efforts. A simpler approach
may be to relinquish a standard definition of “tracking” and
simply allow users to avoid visiting sites they don’t find useful,
regardless of that site’s DNT policy.
Privacy-preserving advertising models such as Adnostic
rely on behavioral targeting in the browser. We encourage this
line of research, though it may not provide solace to users
4https://publicsuffix.org
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Fig. 4. CDF of the reduction in load time of the Alexa top 200 news sites.
The median reduction in page load time is 44% with Tracking Protection.
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Fig. 5. CDF of the reduction in downloaded data of the Alexa top 200 news
sites. The median reduction in data usage is 39% with Tracking Protection.
who find retargeting creepy, or the 30% of users who find ads
annoying [2], [22].
At the same time, content providers who rely on advertising
cannot stay in business without alternative revenue models.
Google Contributor is a promising alternative revenue model
for publishers. It allows people to pay a monthly fee between
$1-3 for an ad-free experience, with part of their monthly
contributions going to each site they visit [23].
Finally, browser makers bear tremendous responsibility in
mediating conflicts between privacy interests of users and the
advertising and publishing industries. Tracking Protection for
Firefox is off by default and hidden in advanced settings. We
call upon Mozilla, Microsoft, and other browser makers to
make tracking protection universally available and easy to use.
Only then will the balance of power shift towards interests of
the people instead of industry.
A project page summarizing Tracking Protection
in Firefox is available at https://kontaxis.github.io/
trackingprotectionfirefox/.
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